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INTRODUCTION
"In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity... is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."'
But what if a child cannot be educated like the rest? What if a
child has a learning disability that precludes him or her from
receiving academic benefits from traditional instruction? Shouldn't
that child have the same "equal" opportunity to receive a public
education as that afforded the rest of America's children? These
issues ultimately prompted Congress in 1975 to enact what is now the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).2 In short, this
legislation guaranteed that all children, regardless of their mental or
physical capacity, were entitled to a "free appropriate public educa-
tion."'
Although this landmark legislation was a clear victory for disabled
students, many of whom had been denied access to any type of public
education until 1975, 4 the IDEA left many questions unanswered. 5
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1485 (1994)).
In creating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Congress sought to take a
"more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that
handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
& PUBLIC WELFARE, EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF 1975, S. REP,. No. 168,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. 1425, 1433 [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994).
4. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1432 (explaining
that, prior to 1975, "1.75 million handicapped children [were) receiving no educational services
at all"); see also infra note 21 (detailing Congress' findings regarding failure of handicapped
children to receive adequate educational services).
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One of the most obvious unresolved questions was whether parents
could seek public reimbursement for the expenses incurred through
the private education of their learning disabled child.6 Once that
inquiry was answered in the affirmative,' the narrower issue, on which
this Note focuses, then arose: Could parents be entitled to public
compensation for such a private placement if the school in which they
enroll their child had not been pre-approved by the state for special
education purposes?8 In the 1993 case of Florence County SchoolDistrict
Four v. Carter,9 the United States Supreme Court responded with an
emphatic "yes."' °
This Note focuses on the Carter case, which afforded parents the
long-awaited opportunity to take affirmative control of their disabled
child's education" without necessarily being barred from public
indemnification. 2 Part I of this Note discusses the history of special
education law that led to the enactment of the IDEA and the
subsequent cases that have helped to further define the language of
the Act. Part II analyzes the lower courts' and Supreme Court's
holdings and reasoning in the Carter case. Part III comments on, and
suggests modifications to, portions of the decision in Carter that
require more refinement if they are to have their intended impact on
the special education arena.
5. Questions remained regarding how public school systems nationwide would offer a "free
appropriate public education" to all disabled students. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (18) (1994)
(emphasis added). SeeDell v. Board of Educ. Township High Sch. Dist. 113,32 F.3d 1053, 1061
(7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[a]lIthough Congress might have intended to 'unbundle' the
placement and reimbursement issues, it did not do so"). The court in Dell believed that
separating these two issues was not necessary to preserve federal policy. Id. at 1061.
6. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 362-66 (1985). See infra
note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that parental reimbursement was not precluded in
Burlington).
7. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (holding that parents did not waive right to reimbursement
for private school expenses by enrolling child in private school while proceedings challenging
"individualized education program" of public school continued).
8. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 365 (1993). "This case
presents the narrow question whether Shannon's parents are barred from reimbursement
because the private school in which Shannon enrolled did not meet the [IDEA's] definition of
a 'free appropriate public education.'" Id.
9. 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
10. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 365 (holding that reimbursement for private school chosen by
parents is not barred even if school does not meet education standards of state or IDEA's
definition of free appropriate public education).
11. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which parents were denied
reimbursement due to their disregard of "stay put" provision).
12. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 365 (noting that parents who place their child in private school due
to public school's failure to provide appropriate individualized education program may be
entitled to reimbursement from state).




Congress first addressed the problem of educating the handicapped
in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA).'s In this amendment, Congress established a
grant program to assist the states in the "initiation, expansion, and
improvement of programs and projects ... for the education of
handicapped children." 4 Four years later, Congress repealed this
legislation with the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).'
Under the newly promulgated EHA, Congress granted similar
financial incentives to states to develop educational resources and to
train personnel in educating the handicapped. 6
Two district court decisions encouraging access of handicapped
students to public schools 7 spurred Congress in 1974 to increase
federal funding for existing programs and require, for the first time,
that states adopt as their goal to "provide full educational opportuni-
ties to all handicapped children."" In the following year, Congress
13. Elementary & Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750,80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1965)
(codified in part as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and partially repealed by Pub.
L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 173 (1970)).
14. Md
15. Pub. L No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C. (1994)).
16. 1l at 178-81. None of the legislation contained specific guidelines for state use of the
grant money. Both the ESEA and the EHA were aimed primarily at encouraging the states to
enhance their education of disabled children. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1425; HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 332,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.CAN. 1425, 1433 (hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (outlining unspecified objectives
of both acts); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.1 (1982) (discussing policy
aims of pre-IDEA legislation).
17. See Mills v. Board of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972)
(encouraging mandatory access for all handicapped children to adequate publicly supported
education); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp.
1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (preventing schools from denying "to any mentally retarded child
access to a free public program of education and training"), mrdijied, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972). Ten years later the Supreme Court stated that "the principles which [these two cases]
established are the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act."
Rowey, 458 U.S. at 194.
18. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,88 Stat. 579,
580 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1402-1403, 1411-1413 (1994)). Congress recognized
that this statute was an interim measure, enacted to provide an additional year for Congress to
study the need for federal financial assistance to better meet the needs of handicapped children.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 24, repinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1426-28.
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enacted The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA) in order to establish grants to states for the education of
children with disabilities. 19 Congress amended the statute in 1991,
changing the Act's name to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA). 2
2. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Congress created the EAHCA, the precursor to the IDEA, in
response to congressional hearings that revealed that almost two
million children with disabilities were being excluded from public
schools, and another two and a half million were receiving inadequate
education." The IDEA thus offers the incentive of federal financial
assistance to states that agree to guarantee that all of their public
school systems will comply with the regulations and procedures set
forth in the Act.22
The purpose of IDEA is simple:
[T] o assure that all children with disabilities have available to them
... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs, to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and
their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and
localities to provide for the education of all children with disabili-
ties ....
Congress and the courts have debated the meaning of "free appropri-
ate public education" (FAPE) for years.24 The IDEA defines FAPE
19. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 91 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994)).
20. Education of the Handicapped ActAmendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,104 Stat.
1103, 1142 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994)). Final regulations for the Act were
published in the Federal Register on September 29, 1992, Assistance to States for the Education
of Children with Disabilities Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,794 (1992) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300),
with a correction appearing in the Federal Register on October 27, 1992, Assistance to States
for the Education of Children with Disabilities Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,694 (1992) (codified
at 34 C.FR. § 300). The explanations of the IDEA set forth below refer to specific sections of
the federal regulations in which the reader can find the precise language of the issues being
discussed. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300-300.754 (1995).
21. SENATF REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA.N. 1425, 1432. Congress
found that, of the 8 million disabled children in 1974-1975, "only 3.9 million ... [were)
receiving an appropriate education. 1.75 million handicapped children [were] receiving no
educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped children [were] receiving an
inappropriate education." Id.
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (18) (1994). The IDEA offers financial assistance to all states that
develop programs meeting the prescribed minimum standard of a free and appropriate
education. Id.; see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982) (defining prescribed
minimum standard for education appropriate under IDEA).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
24. Id § 1401(a) (18). The concept of a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) for
disabled children was first conceived by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [hereinafter
§ 504], which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by any agency that receives
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as "special education' and related services"2" that are "provided at
public expense" and "in conformity with [an] individualized education
program."27 Only when a child's disability gives rise to the need for
special education and related services is that child eligible for
protection under the IDEA."
federal financial assistance. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). Section 504 is broader than the IDEA because it deals with
disabilities within all federally funded institutions, not solely within school systems, and it applies
to all individuals within those entities, not simply to students. Id. Section 504 states that:
[No otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise
be subjected to discrimination underany program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
Id. For a detailed evaluation of the rights and responsibilities associated with § 504, see
generally U.S. OFFICE FOR CMu. RIGHITS, DEP'T OF EDUC., THE RIGHTS OF INDIDUALS WITH
HANDICAPS UNDER FEDERAL LAW (Feb. 1989) (describing responsibilities of elementary and
secondary schools in providing education in regular classes and providing supportive
psychological services if needed); see also Julie F. Mead, Including Students with Disabilities in
Parental Choice Programs: The Challenge of Meaningful Choic 100 EDUC. L. REP. 463,465-73 (1995)
(discussing how § 504 relates to creation of IDEA).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(a)(1) (1995) (defining "special
education" as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique
needs of a child with a disability"). Special education can include classroom instruction, home
instruction, and instruction in hospitals, institutions, or other settings. 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(a) (1)
(1995). Special education can also include instruction in physical education and vocational
education. Id. FAPE also requires that special education be provided to students with
disabilities in what is known as the "least restrictive environment." d. § 300.550(b) (1). Both
the IDEA and its regulations have provisions requiring disabled children to be educated with
nondisabled children, to the maximum extent appropriate. Id. § 300.550(b)(2). Each state
must ensure thatspecial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular school environment occurs only when the severity or nature of the disability
prevents successful education in regular classroom settings. Id. The education of other
nondisabled students also can play a factor in the decision to remove a disabled child from
mainstream education. Id. For a concise explanation of where special education instruction is
provided, see Purposes and Promises of the 1DEA-Who is Eligiblefor Services and Mat Types of Services
areProvided?, NICHCY NEWs DIGEST (National Information Center for Children andYouth with
Disabilities, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1993, at 3 [hereinafter NICHCY, Purposes and Promises of
the lDEA] (explaining educational placement options for disabled children).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (17) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1995) (defining "related
services" as "transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
as are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education"). The IDEA
identifies a non-exhaustive list of related services that can be provided at public expense. Id.;
34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a). Related services may include: audiology; psychological services; physical
therapy, occupational therapy- medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes only;
school health services; recreation, including therapeutic recreation; counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling- early identification and assessment of disabilities in children;
social work services in schools; transportation; speech pathology, and parent counseling and
training. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.16; see also NICHCY, Purposes and Promises of the IDEA, supra note
25, at 3 (reviewing all related services associated with IDEA).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17); see also infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing
purposes and regulations of Individualized Education Program (IEP)).
28. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (1995). The regulations accompanying the IDEA list the following
disability categories:
mental retardation; hearing impairments, including deafness; speech or language
impairments; visual impairments including blindness; serious emotional disturbance;
orthopedic impairments; autism; traumatic brain injury- other health impairments;
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The first step towards achieving a FAPE is to give the allegedly
disabled child an Individualized Education Program (IEP).11 The
Supreme Court has described the IEP as the modus operandi of the
IDEA.' ° Although the IEP is not a "guarantee by the public agency
and the teacher"3" that the child will achieve all of his or her goals,
it is a cooperative approach between school officials and parents to
the development of a specialized program for the student.32
An IEP is a written statement of the educational program that is
designed to meet a child's "unique needs."33 The chief purposes of
the IEP are to establish learning goals for the child and to state the
services that the school district will provide in an effort to reach those
goals.34 The IDEA requires that the school district provide an IEP
to every child receiving a special education.35 The IEP must include
statements about: (1) the child's current level of educational perfor-
mance; 6 (2) the specific educational and related services to be
provided, and the extent to which the child will be able to participate
in regular educational programs;'7 (3) annual goals, including short-
specific learning disabilities; deaf-blindness; or multiple disabilities.
Id. Although children who are eligible for IDEA coverage also are covered under the protection
of § 504, some children with disabilities not listed under IDEA's regulations may be protected
solely under § 504. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). For example, a crippled child would not be
considered "disabled" under IDEA, unless the child's limited mobility directly impaired his or
her ability to be educated (i.e., created an educational handicap). Id. This physically
handicapped child, however, would be protected under § 504 provisions. Id. In other words,
if a child can achieve satisfactory scholastic progress without special instruction, IDEA does not
apply. See Mead, supra note 24, at 471 (explaining limits of protection for disabled children
under IDEA and § 504).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (20) (1994). During congressional hearings prior to the passage
of the IDEA, considerable testimony was given attesting to the fact that children with disabilities
were being poorly categorized and identified. 121 CONG. REC. 16,998 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435.
Congress enacted the IEP to satisfy the substantial need for comprehensive evaluations for
accurate identification of and adequate accommodations for children's disabilities. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CAN. 1425, 1435; see also Ava Crow,
Obtaining Appropriate Educational Sewicesfor Students with Disabilities, 2 KY. CHILDREN'S RTs.J. 19,
25 n.48 (1992) (discussing congressional hearings leading to enactment of IDEA).
30. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) (noting that
goals of IDEA are realized through IEPs, which provide comprehensive statement of needs of
child).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (1995).
32. Id.
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (20) (1994).
34. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1995).
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (5) (1994).
36. Id. § 1401(a) (20) (A). This portion of the IEP may include information concerning the
student's academic achievement, social adaptation, prevocational and vocational skills, sensory
and motor skills, self-help skills, and speech and language skills. Individualized Education
Program for Shannon E. Carter, Florence County School District Four, South Carolina, May 1,
1985 (on file with The American University Law Review).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(C) (1994).
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term instructional objectives; 8 (4) the scheduled start and end dates
for specific services; 9 and (5) the school district's method for
measuring the achievement of the short-term instructional objec-
tives.' This information is used in the planning of transition
services, which are an annual requirement of the IEP for students who
are age sixteen and older. 1
The IDEA mandates parental and teacher involvement in the
development of the IEP.42 School districts must notify parents in
advance of an IEP meeting, and efforts must be made to choose a
mutually convenient meeting time and place. 3 Parents may choose
to bring additional parties, such as advisors or attorneys, to the
meeting.' Unfortunately, parents are often intimidated by school
officials, confused by educational practices and terminology, or fail to
attend IEP meetings at all. 5 Whether or not the parents are active
participants in the creation of their child's IEP, barring specific
38. Id. § 1401(a) (20) (B).
39. Id. § 1401(a)(20)(E).
40. Id. § 1401(a) (20) (F).
41. Id. § 1401 (a) (20) (D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 note 2 (1995).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (20); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a) (1995). Pursuant to the IDEA, the
following people must be invited to attend the IEP development meeting: one or both of the
child's parents (subject to requirements in 34 C.F.R. § 300.345); the child's teacher(s); a
representative of the school other than the child's teacher (this person must be qualified to
provide special education or supervise its provision); other individuals, at the discretion of the
school or the parents; and, when appropriate, the child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(c).
'The Department of Education currently is proposing amendments to the IEP provisions of
the IDEA. See infra note 188 (discussing Clinton administration's 1995 proposed amendments).
The Administration explains that the IEP is "developed for each child [and] often reflects low
expectations and fragmented goals. About half of all children with disabilities are excluded
from general State and local assessments of student performance." U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A
SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL 3 (Oct. 1995) (on file with TheAmerican University
Law Review) [hereinafter CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL]. In order to improve these
statistics, the Administration proposes three enhancements: (1) focus the IEP on enabling the
child to participate and achieve academic goals in the general curriculum; (2) require at least
one regular education teacher to participate in the IEP meeting, in addition to the special
education teacher, when the child is or may be participating in the regular education
environment; and (3) require schools to regularly apprise parents of their child's progress, at
least as often as parents of nondisabled children are informed. Id.
43. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a)(1) (1995).
44. Id. § 300.345 & note.
45. Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality
System for All Students, 57 HARV. EDUC. REV. 367, 378 (1987) (discussing study that found that
parents provided no input in 70% of IEPs and parents only attended IEP meetings in half of
cases). Parents who challenge school systems' IEPs are often berated or criticized for not
"trusting" the professionals, and often yield to the school districts' proposals. Id.; see also
Rebecca Weber Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive Environment. Promises
Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. DAYrON L. REv. 243,
279 (1994) (characterizing parity position of parents and school officials as "illusory"). In its
1995 amendments to the IDEA, the Department of Education plans to require that parents be
involved in the educational placement of their child. CLINTONADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra
note 42, at 2. As parents are now entitled to attend meetings, they would also be entitled to
participate in placement decisions. Id.
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procedures overriding a parental refusal of consent,46 the school
district must obtain the parents' written consent prior to an initial
placement of the child in a special education program.47
The IDEA includes an entire section dealing with "procedural
safeguards"" that are designed to protect the rights of disabled
children and their parents.4 9 These safeguards include, inter alia, the
parents' right (1) to inspect and review their child's education
records;- (2) to obtain an independent educational evaluation;-"
(3) to receive written prior notice on matters regarding the identifica-
tion, evaluation, or educational placement of their child, or the
provision of FAPE to their child;5 2 (4) to request a due process
hearing on these matters;53 (5) to appeal the initial hearing decision
to the State Education Agency (SEA), if the agency did not conduct
the initial hearing;' 4 (6) to allow the child to remain in his or her
current placement while administrative or judicial proceedings are
pending;55 and (7) to bring a civil action in an appropriate state or
federal court to appeal a final hearing decision.5 6
When, as in the Carter case, parents are dissatisfied with the school's
recommendations regarding the special needs of their child, they
have a few options. Parents may choose to have a conference or
an IEP review with school staff, which may include teachers, counsel-
ors, the principal, the director of special education, or the superinten-
46. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b) (2) (1995). When state law requires parental consent and the
parents refuse to grant it, the school district must follow state procedures, such as obtaining a
court order authorizing the school to conduct the evaluation or placing the student in a special
education program. Id. When state law does not require parental consent, the school may
conduct the evaluation using the due process procedures set forth in the IDEA. Id.
§ 300.504(b) (3). Regardless of whether parental consent is obtained, notification to parents of
intended practices is required. Id.
47. Id. § 800.504(b) (ii).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994).
49. The Fourth Circuit has stated that "[u]nder Rowey, ... failure to meet the Act's
procedural requirements are adequate grounds by themselves for holding that the school failed
to provide a ... FAPE" for a disabled student. Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629,
635 (4th Cir. 1985).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (A) (1994).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1415(b) (1) (C).
53. Id. § 1415(b) (2); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing details of due
process hearings).
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1994).
55. ld § 1415(e) (3) (A).
56. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
57. See NICHCY, Purposes and Promises of the DEA, supra note 25, at 10 (discussing options
for parental challenges to school systems when not in agreement with decisions or school
recommendations).
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dent.58 The parents also may opt for mediation, in which a third
party attempts to negotiate a solution or compromise between the
school system and the parents. 9
Additionally, parents can seek a due process hearing or file a
complaint for the violation of IDEA-6° As in the Carter case, parents
can request a due process hearing if they are not content with the
identification, evaluation, educational placement, or progress of their
child.6 1 A due process hearing involves an impartial hearing officer
who issues a decision based on the evidence and the requirements of
the IDFA.62  The hearing must be conducted by the SEA or by the
school district directly responsible for the child's education within
forty-five days of receipt of the parent's request.63 All parties
involved have the right to be accompanied and advised by specially
trained individuals or attorneys and to present their case, much like
a regular civil trial.' Parents have the right under the IDEA to have
their child present and to have the hearing and its findings open to
the public.65 The hearing officer's decision is final, unless an appeal
is made to the SEA,66 in which case the SEA conducts an impartial
review and submits a decision within thirty days of receipt of the
request for review. Only after these administrative remedies have
been exhausted, as they were in the Carters' situation, may parents
bring a civil suit.'u
The final administrative option for unsatisfied parents is to file a
complaint with the SEA, alleging a public violation of the IDEA.69
58. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1995).
59. Id Mediation processes are not required by IDEA, and states cannot mandate that
parents use this process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1994). Mediation may not be used to delay or
deny a parent's right to due process. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1415(b) (2); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1995) (providing procedure for initiating
impartial due process hearing). The public educational agency also has the right to request a
due process hearing if it feels that the parent's refusal of consent to special education of a child
is inappropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2), (6) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b)(3).
62. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (1)-(2). Regulations require that this person must not be an
employee of the school district involved in educating the child, nor have any personal or
professional interest that might impair his or her objectivity in the hearing. Id.; see Dell v. Board
of Educ. Township High Sch. Dist. 113, 32 F.3d 1053, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994) (asserting that
hearing officer's relationship with moving party must be "direct, personal and substantial" in
order to result in violation of constitutional rights).
63. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1995).
64. Id § 300.508.
65. Id& § 300.508(b); id § 300.508(a) (5) (ii).
66. I& § 300.509.
67. See id. §§ 300.510-.512 (providing two possible avenues for administrative review and
setting time limit for SEA's final decision).
68. Id. § 300.511.
69. See id. §§ 300.660-.662 (providing state complaint procedures for alleged violations of
IDEA).
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This method is a more popular approach to dispute resolution than
the due process hearing,70 and the SEA is obligated to resolve such
complaints within sixty calendar days from the date of filing.71 The
written complaint must include the specific provisions of the Act that
allegedly have been violated by the state or local school system and
the facts supporting those allegations. 2 The SEA has the option of
either investigating the complaint on its own or directing the school
district under question to conduct its own investigation.7 Regard-
less, the SEA must review all relevant facts and make a determination
as to whether an IDEA violation has occurred.74 If either party is




For years after the enactment of the IDEA, courts struggled to find
a consistent and concrete definition for an "appropriate education."
"The case law interpreting all of the regulations of the IDEA fill[ed]
volumes."' In order to shed light on the ideals of the IDEA, and to
properly apply them to cases in which learning disabled children were
being denied their educational rights, the courts had to consider what
was "appropriate," what was "free," and, most importantly, whether a
FAPE could include a private educational setting.
1. What is "appropriate"?
The Supreme Court, in 1982, finally tackled the "what is appropri-
ate?" inquiry in Board of Education v. Rowley.77 This landmark case
centered around the educational needs of Amy Rowley, an eight-year-
old deaf girl, whose parents requested that a qualified sign language
interpreter be present in all of their daughter's classes.78 A federal
district court in New York had previously found that, although Amy
70. SeeNICHCY, Purposes and Promises of the IDEA, supra note 25, at 11-12 (noting that many
parents select complaint resolution process over due process hearings to resolve disputes because
complaint resolution process tends to be less intimidating).
71. 34 C.F.R. § 300.661 (1995).
72. Id. § 300.662.
73. See U §§ 300.600-.601 (requiring adoption of minimum complaint procedures).
74. I& § 300.601.
75. Secretarial review of complaints is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for the
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services. SeeLetter of Clarification from the U.S.
Department of Education (Dec. 4, 1991) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(elucidating due process procedure and state complaint process).
76. See Mead, supra note 24, at 5 (reviewing case rulings regarding appropriateness and
other relevant factors of special education).
77. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
78. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
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was progressing well from grade to grade and was performing better
than average for her class, she was not performing as well as she
would have without her handicap.79 This disparity between the
child's academic potential and her actual performance led the district
court to hold that she was not receiving a FAPE, which the court
defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensu-
rate with the opportunity provided to other children.""0 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.1 The Supreme Court,
in a six-to-three decision, disagreed and denied the additional, special
instruction for the deaf student."2
The Rowleys contended that the EAHCA, the IDEA's precursor,
included a nonfunctional statutory definition of FAPE that offered
judges no guidance in their consideration of controversies involving
the assessment of children with special needs.83 The Supreme Court
used the Act's legislative history to reject this theory and to establish
the existence of a working definition.'
The Court concluded that the lower courts had misconstrued the
original intent of the EAHCA and stated, "Certainly the language of
the statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by the
lower courts-that States maximize the potential of handicapped
children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children. ' "' The Court held that the EAHCA does not address a
substantive standard or level to which a handicapped child must be
79. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528,532 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1980), reu'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The district court found thatAmy "understands considerably
less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf" and thus "is not learning as
much, or performing as well academically, as she would without her handicap." Id.
80. Id. at 534. The district court concluded that "[t]he Act itself does not define
'appropriate education,'" and proceeded to define the term itself. Id. at 533. The Supreme
Court, in its reversal of the Second Circuit's affirmation of the district court, stated that the true
definition of FAPE is found in § 1401(a) (18) of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act. See Rowey, 458 U.S. at 186 n.8 (emphasizing district court's mistakes in statutory
construction and use of incorrect guidance for interpretation of "appropriate education");
Education for All Handicapped Children Act. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 84 Stat. 175 (1975) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994)).
81. 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
82. See Rowey. 458 U.S. at 210 (holding that lower courts should not have concluded that
Act requires provision of sign-language interpreter because evidence "firmly establish[ed] that
Amy [was] receiving an 'adequate' education").
83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Rowley v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 176
(1982) (No. 80-1002), at 13. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the
Rowleys, agreed, stating, "Although the Act includes definitions of a 'free appropriate public
education' and other related terms, the statutory definitions do not adequately explain what is
meant by 'appropriate.'" Id.
84. Rowy, 458 U.S. at 188. The Court stated, "Like many statutory definitions, this one
tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is scarcely a reason for
abandoning the quest for legislative intent." Id.
85. 1& at 189-90 (quoting Rowl-y, 483 F. Supp. at 534).
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educated, only that the states must provide for educational pro-
grams.8 6 In the words of Associate Justice Rehnquist writing for the
Court, "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to
guarantee any particular level of education once inside." 7
For Amy Rowley, the public education "door" was opened, yet the
Court found that the EAHCA did not require the school board to
educate her in an atmosphere most conducive to helping her reach
her full academic potential.88 Thus, although the decision in Rowley
benefitted handicapped students by defining the elusive FAPE, it also
fell substantially short of guaranteeing an "equal" education to all
students.89 The Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to
provide a "basic floor of opportunity,"9 ° consisting of "access to
specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.""'
2. What is "free"?
Once the Court in Rowley clarified what was "appropriate" under the
IDEA's FAPE, many cases followed attempting to determine what
should be "free."92 The magnitude of the decision in Carter is best
86. See id. at 192 (finding that "Congress did not impose upon the states any greater
substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful").
87. Id. (emphasis added). The Court focused on the 1971 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania and the 1972 Mills v. Board of Educ. cases as the source of
Congress' intent while enacting the EAHCA. Id. The Court stated:
Neither case purports to require any particular substantive level of education ...
Indeed, immediately after discussing these cases the Senate Report describes the 1974
statute as having 'incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases.'
*.. Those principles in turn became the basis of the Act, which itself was designed to
effectuate the purposes of the 1974 statute.
Id at 193-94 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, repinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433).
88. Id. at 198.
89. The Rowleys contended that the "'goal of the [EAHCA was] ... to provide each
handicapped child with an equal educational opportunity.'" Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief at
35 (No. 80-1002)). The Court disagreed, explaining that because "[t]he educational
opportunities provided by our public school systems undoubtedly differ from student to student,
... [t]he requirement that States provide 'equal' educational opportunities would thus seem
to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and
comparisons." Id. The Court continued, "neither the Act nor its history persuasively
demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal
access." Id. at 200.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 201.
92. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985)
(entitling parents to public reimbursement for private schooling of disabled child); Antkowiak
ex reL Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641-42 (2d Cir.) (prohibiting public payment for
private school tuition), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988); Rollison v. Biggs,
656 F. Supp. 1204, 1211-12 (D. Del. 1987) (denying reimbursement for "delay factor" of private
schooling); Schimmel v. Spillane, 630 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D. Va. 1986) (rejecting parental
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understood in light of the cases that led to it. The IDEA makes clear
that parents are entitled to challenge any public educational setting
on the grounds that the environment is not "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade.""3 A problem arises, however, when the child is required
under the IDEA to remain in the current educational setting until it
is determined whether the educational setting meets these require-
ments. 4 This so called "stay put provision"" of the IDEA was first
litigated in 1980,96 when the Fourth Circuit held that parents of a
disabled child were under a duty to keep the student in the public
educational environment until their IEP appeals were finished."
Five years later in a different case, the Supreme Court considered this
provision and disagreed with the Fourth Circuit.9"
In Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education,9 9 the Court
held that parents of a disabled child are entitled to reimbursement
for private school expenses incurred while the appeals process is
proceeding.' °0 As the Court in Burlington explained, "review of a
contested IEP takes years to run its course-years critical to the child's
development."0 l  In the meantime, parents who disagree with the
proposed IEP are faced with an unfortunate decision to either:
go along with the IEEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out
to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the
appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which
conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are
reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would
reimbursement for out-of-state school tuition), affd, 819 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1987).
93. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995). The IDEA states that "during the
pendency of any proceedings ... the child shall remain in the then current educational
placement of such child." Id.
95. See Timothy M. Huskey, Teaching the Children "Appropriately Publicly Financed Private
Education Under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 60 Mo. L. REV. 167, 172 (1995)
(emphasizing inadequacy of retaining child in current educational circumstances while
proceedings are pending). Professor Huskey refers to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (1994) as the "stay
put" provision. Id.
96. Stemple v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Rowe v. Henry County
Sch. Bd., 718 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that parents are not at liberty to remove
child from public school until final determination is made).
97. The Fourth Circuit admitted that it was reading the § 1415 (e) (3) (then § 615(e) (3))
requirement literally. Stemple, 623 F.2d at 897.
98. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985).
99. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
100. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373. The Burlington case involved a first grader with "specific
learning disabilities," which, under the IDEA, "entitled him to receive at public expense specially
designed instruction to meet his unique needs." Id. at 361. The Burlington public school
district failed to offer what the parents considered an appropriate IEP, and the parents' appeals
process spanned more than eight years. Id.
101. Id.
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be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that
they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper
case be reimbursed by the school officials.'
Until the decision in Burlington, many disabled children were forced
to remain in inadequate educational surroundings while their appeals
were pending.'0 3 Unless parents were financially secure enough to
withdraw their special needs child and place him or her in a private
school, the child might wait years until the school board determined
that another institution was better suited for that student.1' 4 The
IDEA, thus, was failing the very children it was created to aid. The
Court in Burlington believed that Congress could not have intended
such a result and held "that by empowering the court to grant
'appropriate' relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimburse-
ment to parents as an available remedy in a proper case."10"
In essence, the Court in Burlington allowed parents to 'jump the
gun" in anticipation of the results of the administrative and judicial
review and to place their disabled children in institutions that the
public educational system had previously chosen as appropriate
substitutes to public schooling.0 ' Later, if it was found that the
parents' unilateral placement was proper under the Act, the school
was obligated not only to take over payment for the private school,
but also to reimburse the parents for expenses incurred prior to the
decision." Alternatively, if the courts ultimately determined that
the unilateral placement of the disabled student was inappropriate
under the IDEA, the parents were barred from reimbursement for any
102. I& at 370.
103. See id. at 372-73 (finding that under town's reading of§ 1415(e) (3), parents are forced
either to leave child in what ultimately may be inappropriate educational placement or to
remove child and sacrifice any claim for reimbursement).
104. Id. at 370.
105. See id. (finding that Congress could not have intended "empty victory" for parents who
choose to take action during pendency of review proceedings and prevail on appeal).
106. Id. at 372. The Court found that violating § 1415(e) (3) did not, per se, constitute a
waiver of parental reimbursement.
"The provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, or parental right to
reimbursement at the conclusion ofjudicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision
is interpreted to cut offparental rights to reimbursement, the principle purpose of the
[IDEA] will in many cases be defeated in the same way as if reimbursement were never
available."
Id. The decision in Burlington was limited to situations in which the school unilaterally chosen
by the parents was already pre-approved by the state. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying
text (discussing significance of holding in Tucker). See generally Jerry R. Parkinson, Parents'
Unilateral Placement of a Disabled Child in an Unapproved Private Schook A "Free Appropriate Public
Education"?, 76 ED. L. REP. 893 (1992) (comparing decisions in Burlington and Carterregarding
pre-approved status of school).
107. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-73 (finding that "Congress intended to include retroactive
reimbursement as remedy in proper cases" and that parental violation of§ 1415(e) (3) does not
constitute waiver of reimbursement).
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period in which the child's placement was not in accordance with the
Act."0 Thus, although complete reimbursement is allowed under
Burlington, parents who remove their child from public schools do so
at the risk that the proceedings will be decided in favor of the school
district and, consequently, will deny any reimbursement for education-
al expenses.109
3. Whether "appropriate education" includes private schooling
While the decision in Burlington was a victory for parents of disabled
children, the opinion did not address the issue of whether parents are
entitled under the IDEA to reimbursement when their unilateral
choice of a private, specialized education-which, up until that point
in time, has not been pre-approved by the school district-is an
appropriate substitute. The majority of case law supported the theory
that unless parents chose a school that was pre-approved by the state
in which their child was publicly enrolled, reimbursement under the
IDEA was impossible.'
In a 1989 case with facts remarkably similar to those of Carter,
Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free School District,111 the Second Circuit
followed this long line of cases and held that the IDEA requires "that
handicapped children be educated at public expense only in those
private schools that meet [s]tate educational standards.""1 2 This
case involved Jonas Tucker, a learning disabled child, whose parents
108. I. at 373-74. The Court in Burlington supported its conclusion by referring to the
regulations accompanying the IDEA: "If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate
public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the
public agency is not required ... to pay for the child's education at the private school or
facility." Id. at 374 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a) (1984)).
109. Id. (noting that "parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the
pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at
their own financial risk").
110. See, e.g., Antkowiak ax rel Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641-42 (2d Cir.)
(prohibiting reimbursement for unilateral parental placement in out-of-state private school
although proceedings found it appropriate under IDEA), cert. denied sub non. Doe v. Sobol, 488
U.S. 850 (1988); Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 778 F. Supp. 774, 779-80 (S.D.N.Y
1991) (denying reimbursement regardless of fact that placement would have been appropriate);
Hiller v. Board of Educ., 687 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that state had no
authority to place child in unapproved facility or to reimburse parents for doing so); Schimmel
v. Spillane, 630 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D. Va. 1986) (rejecting mandatory reimbursement to
parents for placement in unapproved out-of-state school), afj'd 819 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1987);
Taglianetti v. Cronin, 493 N.E.2d 29, 32-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting reimbursement for
nonapproved out-of-state residential school tuition).
111. 873 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1989).
112. Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Antkviak 838 F.2d at 640); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (requiring
that FAPE "meet the standards of the State educational agency"); Schimme 819 F.2d at 484
(holding that "[t]he statute simply does not permit school systems to place and fund
handicapped children in unapproved private schools").
1996] FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR V. CARTER 1495
unilaterally placed him in a private school as a result of undue delay
in the school district's creation of an IEP." 3  The IEP was not
completed untilJonas' school year had already begun, at which point,
his parents challenged the program on the grounds that it was
untimely and inappropriate for their son."4 Nearly two years after
Jonas' initial private enrollment, a hearing officer found that although
the private school in which Jonas had been placed met the student's
educational needs, it had not been approved by the Commissioner of
Education for the State of New York for public funding for the
education of handicapped children."5 Thus, under the administra-
tive appeals process, the Tuckers were not entitled to reimburse-
ment.'16
In upholding the hearing officer's decision, the Second Circuit
sought to discourage parents from sidestepping their duty to work
cooperatively with the school district 7 and from unilaterally
enrolling their disabled children in the school of their choice, relying
on the fact that the school district would cover the cost of the educa-
tion." 8  The court stressed that the Act "guarantees to a handi-
capped child an education that is 'appropriate,' not one that provides
everything that might be thought desirable by 'loving parents. '"119
In reaching its decision, the court in Tucker relied on its earlier
1988 opinion in Antkowiak ex rel. Antkowiak v. Ambach, '2 which
113. Tucker, 873 F.2d at569 (noting that school district made Jonas' placement recommenda-
tion on September 11, approximately 10 days after school year had begun).
114. Id. at 564.
115. Id. The Commissioner upheld the hearing officer's decision. Id. The Second Circuit
explained in a footnote:
An unapproved school is not necessarily an inferior school. There was evidence before
the hearing officer that would suggest that [Jonas' private school's] unapproved status
was at least in part the consequence of its unwillingness to follow the state approved
curriculum or to admit emotionally disturbed students.
Id. at 564 n.1. The IDEA mandates that states seeking to receive federal funding under the Act
must submit a state plan to the Secretary of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
The plan must include several assurances regarding, inter alia, proper expenditures of federal
funds, personnel development and certification, and what steps the state is taking to assure a
FAPE to all disabled students. Id. §§ 1412(2), 1413. The Secretary of Education must approve
the state's plan prior to releasing federal funds. Id. § 1413.
116. Tucker, 873 F.2d at 564.
117. Id. The court emphasized the "importance of the responsibilities placed on both
parents and school officials to work together in a 'cooperative approach'" toward attaining a
FAPE for the child. Id. (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,
368 (1985)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 567 (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
120. 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Doe v. Sobol, 488 U.S. 850 (1988). The
court in Antkowiak relied on the Fourth Circuit's 1987 decision in Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d
477 (4th Cir. 1987), in which a handicapped boy was denied publicly funded out-of-state
education. See also infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (criticizing strict statutory reading
that resulted in denial of FAPE).
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focused on two provisions of the Act: first, that a FAPE must "meet
the standards of the state educational agency,"' and, second, that
students' private education costs may be reimbursed only "if such
children are placed in or referred to such schools or facilities by the
State or appropriate local educational agency."22 In their appeal,
the Tuckers attempted to distinguish their case from Antkowiak by
arguing that they, as parents, and not the school district, placed Jonas
in a private setting. 121 The court rejected this argument, noting the
irrelevancy of who affected the placerment and emphasizing the fact
that the school had an "unapproved status." 24
In the 1993 case of Florence County School District Four v. Carter,25
however, the Fourth Circuit rejected the analysis of its sister circuit
when it held that "placement in a private school not approved by the
state is not a bar to reimbursement under the Act. " 126 This decision
was upheld by the Supreme Court.Y2 7
II. FLOREWCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FouR V. CARTER
A. Facts
The Carter case involved Shannon Carter, a learning disabled
teenager at the beginning of the challenge, who was twenty-two years
old and attending a community college by the time her case was
granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.128  Her educational
problems, however, were stifling in her younger years.
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (18) (b) (1994); see also Antkowiak ex reL Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838
F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir.) (emphasizing importance of SEA approval of private school), cert. denied
sub nom. Doe v. Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (4) (B) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
123. Tucker, 873 F.2d at 566. The court noted that the disabled child in Antkowiak was placed
in a private school only after the parents and the school district agreed on a private placement.
Id.; see alsoAntkowiak, 838 F.2d at 641-42 (noting parent's obligation to work togetherwith school
officials to find "appropriate" placement).
In contrast to the placement in Antkowdak, the school district in Tucker could not locate an
institution that would accept the student. Consequently, the student's parents, rather than the
school district, placed her in an unapproved, out-of-state institution at their own expense.
Tucker, 873 F.2d at 564. For a detailed discussion of how the court in Tucker relied on Second
Circuit precedent, see Parkinson, supra note 106, at 898 (reviewing prior cases regarding
unilateral placement).
124. Tucke; 873 F.2d at 568.
125. 950 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1991), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
126. Florence County Sch. Dist. Fourv. Carter, 950 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1991), affid, 114 S. Ct.
361 (1993) (emphasis added).
127. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993).
128. Peter W.D. Wright, Counsel of Record for Shannon Carter, Address at the Fifteenth
National Institute on Legal Issues of Educating Individuals with Disabilities (May 4, 1994).
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When Shannon was thirteen years old, she returned to the public
school system as a seventh grader in Florence County, South Carolina,
after having attended a private school for grades two through six.'29
At the request of her parents, the school district evaluated Shannon
twice for her inability to read, and concluded that her ineptitude was
a result not of a learning disability, but of a lack of motivation."s
At the age of sixteen, Shannon was still functionally illiterate and had
become severely depressed.' A psychologist then tested Shannon
and concluded that she was indeed learning disabled and of average
to above average intelligence. 32
In compliance with the IDEA,"s the school district constructed an
IEP,1  designed to allow Shannon to achieve minimal progress in
her reading, math, and other academic skills." The proposed IEP
set a four-month scholastic advancement as Shannon's goal for an
entire academic year." The Carters contended that such minimal
academic progress was inadequate, and, upon a refusal of the school
board to consider other options, they requested a special education
due process hearing. 7 There, the parents requested funding for
129. Transcript, Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993) (No. 91-
1523), at 27 [hereinafter Carter Transcript] (statement of Peter W.D. Wright).
130. Id.
131. See Donna Childress, Lawyer Wins Personal Victoy in Education Case, 8 V.L.W. 636, 636
(Nov. 22, 1993) (noting that Carters' attorney feared that Shannon had become "borderline
suicidal").
132. Carter Transcript, supra note 129, at 28 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright).
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (5) (1994).
134. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (describing elements of IEP).
135. CarterTranscript, supra note 129, at 28 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright). Shannon's
initial IEP dictated that Shannon remain in regular school classes while spending two hours per
day in a resource room. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 950 F.2d 156, 158-59 (4th
Cir. 1991). Shannon's parents felt that her placement with emotionally disturbed and mentally
retarded children was inappropriate. CarterTranscript, supra note 129, at 28 (statement of Peter
W.D. Wright). Consequently, the school offered an itinerant program consisting of three
periods a week with individualized instruction and the rest of the week in regular classes. Carter,
950 F.2d at 159. This program would have left Shannon, who was then 17 years old, reading
at the fifth grade level and failling further behind her peer group. CarterTranscript, supra note
129, at 28 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright). School officials asserted that the proposed IEP
would improve Shannon's reading scores from the 5.4 (fifth grade, fourth month level) to the
5.8 grade level, and her math scores from the 6.4 to the 6.8 grade level. Peter W.D. Wright, An
Analysis and Case History by Shannon Carter's Attorney (Mar. 1994), at 2 (on file with The
American University Law Review) [hereinafter Wright, Carter Case History] (providing history of
Carter's litigation and overview of concerns regarding educating disabled students).
136. CarterTranscript, supranote 129, at 28 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright); see also Wright,
Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 2 (setting forth inadequate academic achievement goals).
137. Due process hearings are guaranteed under the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1994), and
under the regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1995). See supra note 61 and accompanying text
(describing due process hearings). Based on the recommendation of private evaluators, the
Carters rejected the second proposed itinerant program and requested a self-contained learning
disabled program similar to the program offered "right down the road in Florence County
School District One." CarterTranscript, supra note 129, at 29 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright);
seeWright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 2 (discussing Carters' efforts to place Shannon
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either two neighboring public schools or Trident Academy, a private
institution educating only learning disabled students."' Trident
Academy had not been approved previously by the South Carolina
public school system, yet it was accredited by the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools.' 9 The hearing officer denied the Carters'
requests because he felt that the IEP was appropriately tailored to
meet Shannon's special needs. 4 The Carters, consequently, re-
quested a review hearing, withdrew Shannon from Florence County
School District Four, and enrolled her in Trident Academy.' After
the reviewing officer upheld the decision of the hearing officer, and
having exhausted their administrative appeals, the Carters filed a civil
suit against School District Four in federal district court.'
in appropriate educational setting).
138. Carter Transcript, supra note 129, at 29 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright). In South
Carolina, all public schools, as well as private schools in which disabled children have been duly
placed, must conform to the Defined Minimum Program for South Carolina School Districts
(DMP). S.C. CODE REGS. 4-243(E) (7) (1992); Petitioner's Brief at 3, Florence County Sch. Dist.
Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993) (No. 91-1523) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief). The DMP
specifies the requirements that educators must meet in order to be certified to teach in a South
Carolina public school system. See S.C. CODE REGS. 43-243(7) (1992); Antkowiak ex reL
Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir.) (discussing prerequisites to federal approval
and denial of federal funding for placement of child suffering from anorexia and emotional
disturbances into unapproved, out-of-state educational institution), cert. denied sub noma. Doe v.
Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
139. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 138, at 23-24.
140. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 363 (discussing how both local educational officer and state
educational agency hearing officer claimed three hours per week of individualized education
program was adequate for Shannon). The issue at the due process hearing was not whether one
of the other schools may have been appropriate for educating the disabled student, but, more
simply, whether three hours per week of special instruction was an adequate solution. Carter
Transcript, supra note 129, at34 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright). The Carters contended that
their daughter required "total immersion" in a special education setting and asked whether any
of their suggested schools would be appropriate. Id. at 33. During the oral argument, Justice
O'Connor summarized the school district's reply: "[T]he school district said none of these
schools is any good-not because the schools are not qualified, but simply because [they] insist
that three hours a week is enough. You don't need a self-contained program." Id. at 34
(statement ofJustice O'Connor).
141. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 2. The reviewing officer upheld the
decision of the hearing officer. Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 159
(4th Cir. 1991).
142. The district court's decision is published in INDIVIDUALS WITH DIsABiLITIEs EDUCATION
LAW REPORT (previously published as EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED LAW REPORTER), Carter
v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 17 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. (LRP) 452 (D.S.C.
Jan. 30, 1991). Shannon Carter's attorney's analysis of her case noted that Florence County filed
for a motion to dismiss, asserting that the statute of limitations had run out for an appeal to the
due process hearing. Id. at 3. U.S. DistrictJudge Houck accordingly dismissed the case, and
the Carters appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d
156, 159 (4th Cir. 1991).
While their appeal was pending, the Fourth Circuit issued a related statute of limitations
decision, Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1987) (establishing interest in
extending statute of limitations in cases where judicial review of administrative due process
hearings is requested), which confirmed that the Carter case was filed in a timely fashion. Id.
Pursuant to ajoint motion,Judge Houck reversed himself, the appeal was withdrawn, and the
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B. Courts'Analyses
1. District Court decision
In January 1988, U.S. District Judge Houck reviewed the prior
hearings and heard additional testimony from witnesses on behalf of
the Carters and the school district." On February 6, 1991, the trial
court concluded that District Four's program was "wholly inadequate"
and that Trident Academy afforded Shannon an appropriate
education."t Noting that Shannon, thus far, already had progressed
more than three grade levels in her reading comprehension while at
Trident Academy, Judge Houck stressed that
[e]ven if all of the goals of the [public school's IEP] had been met,
Shannon would continue to fall behind her classmates at an
alarming rate. The stated progress of only four months in her
reading and math skills over an entire school year ensured the
program's inadequacy from its inception. 4
School District Four promptly appealed. 4
6
2. Fourth Circuit decision
On appeal, the petitioning school district asserted that its program
was appropriate and raised a new issue, alleging that if the school
district had defaulted on its obligation to provide a FAPE, the parents
still should be denied reimbursement because Trident Academy was
not on South Carolina's list of approved special education
schools. 47 Thus, the true debate for which the Carter case ultimate-
case was allowed to proceed. Carter, 950 F,.2d at 159.
143. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 3. Thejudge appointed his own expert,
who evaluated and testified about Shannon, the education she was receiving at TridentAcademy,
and the proposed program she would have received in School District Four. Id.
144. Wright, Carter Case History, supranote 135, at2; seealsoCarterv. Florence County Sch.
Dist. Four, 17 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. (LRP) 455, 456 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 1991)
(discussing issue of reimbursement and inadequacy of IEP options). The primary issue before
the trial court was the same issue presented at the due process hearing. See supra note 137
(discussing Shannon's due process hearing). The trial focused on the adequacy of the three
hours per week plan. The credentials of the staff and the quality of the program at Trident
were not at issue and were not litigated. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 3.
145. Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 17 EDUc. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L REP.
(LRP) 452, 455 (D.S.C.Jan. 30, 1991); see also Plaintiffis Memorandum, Special Education Due
Process Hearing- Amy S. v. Southampton County, VA Public Schools (on file with The American
University Law Review).
146. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 950 F.2d 156, 158 (4th Cir. 1991) (appealing
district court decision on grounds that Trident School had to be state-approved to qualify
Respondent for reimbursement).
147. I& at 160-61. The school district argued that, "although its educational program in
many ways parallels what is required under the Act, Trident does not attempt to comply with
the terms of the Act." Id. at 161. The school district claimed that Trident was an inadequate
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ly became known was not at issue until the case was heard in the
Fourth Circuit' 4.
This issue was also more complex in Carter than it was when raised
in the Second Circuit in Tucker. 49 Unlike New York, the state from
which the Tucker case arose, South Carolina did not have a pre-
existing list of "approved" special education schools.," Rather,
South Carolina determined appropriate substitutions on a case-by-case
basis. Neither the Carters nor the school district had approached the
State Department of Education to seek approval for their school of
choice.'
Despite the school district's new argument, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's holding and concluded that the IEP for the
disabled student failed to satisfy the IDEA's minimal requirement of
substitute for disabled children because the institution employed two teachers-including one
of Shannon's teachers--who were not certified to teach in South Carolina public school systems.
e; Se  S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-21-550, 59-25-20 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (outlining requirements for
state approval in South Carolina); S.C. CODE REGS. 43-205 (1982) (same). Seventy-five percent
of the staff at the private school, however, have masters degrees in fields other than special
education and are trained intensively in the Orton-Gillingham method of instruction and
remediation. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 4. For a summary of various types
of special education methods employed in the majority of private institutions, see Peter W.D.
Wright, From the Attorney to the M.D., PEDIATRIC BLOCKS OF KNOWLEDGE, Spring 1994, at 1
[hereinafter PEDIATRIC BLOCKS OF KNOWLEDGE] (explaining Orton-Gillingham method of
teaching). The school district also claimed that because Trident did not develop annual IEPs,
the school could not be publicly recognized. Carter, 950 F.2d at 161. Trident did set goals for
each student, however, and revised them four times a year. Id.
148. School District Four presented the question to the Supreme Court as follows:
Whether a learning disabled child's parents are entitled to state reimbursement under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), when they unilaterally place her
in a private school that does not meet state educational standards or in other respects
satisfy the criteria of a "free appropriate public education," which the state is required
under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (A) (18) and 1412(1) to provide as a condition of receiving
federal funding under the Act.
Petitioner's Brief, suPra note 138, at 1.
149. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Tucker issue). In Tucker, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly decided that because the parents unilaterally placed
their disabled child in an unapproved, private school, they should be denied reimbursement.
Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1989). NewYork had the
Commissioner's "approved list" of schools for the education of the handicapped, and the
Tuckers' chosen school was not on that list. Id. at 566.
150. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 3. South Carolina approves schools on
a case-by-case basis after receiving notice that a public school system is seeking a special
education environment for one of its disabled students. Id.
151. Wright, Carter Case History, supra note 135, at 3. Trident Academy had not been
granted comprehensive approval by the State Board of Education, because the institution did
not conform to the procedures of the IDEA and its IEP. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v.
Carter, 950 F.2d 156, 158 (4th Cir. 1991). Florence County previously had approved Trident
Academy for three special needs children, and the school had never been disapproved by the
state. Respondent's Brief at 28, Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993)
(No. 91-1523) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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academic progress. 152  Therefore, Shannon's parents were entitled
to full reimbursement, regardless of the fact that their private school
placement had not been approved by the state for education of the
handicapped." 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
conceded that the IDEA did not explicitly authorize reimbursement
for unilateral parental placement.TM The court stressed, however,
that the Act's language directed a court to "grant such relief as [it]
determines is appropriate."'55
The Fourth Circuit, disagreeing with the Second Circuit's reasoning
in Tuckeri, explained that the school district "misreads the statute" if
it allows parental reimbursement only in situations where the child is
placed in a state approved private school.156 Such a requirement
"would apply only when the child is placed in the private school by
the state or local school system."'57 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
152. Carter, 950 F.2d at 160. The court noted, "clearly, Congress did not intend that a school
system could discharge its duty under the [Act] by providing a program that produces some
minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivia." Id. (quoting Hall ex. rel Hall v. Vance
County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985)).
153. Md at 163-64. In its holding in favor of the Carters, the Fourth Circuit ignored much
of its own precedent, most notably, the 1987 case, Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477 (4th Cir.
1987) and In re Conklin, 946 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1991). In Schimme4 the court held that the
unapproved status of an out-of-state private school, in which parents unilaterally placed their
learning disabled child, precluded reimbursement to the parents for the costs "incurred
pursuant to their unilateral decision to enroll [their child]" in the school. Schimm4 819 F.2d
at 484. The Second Circuit relied heavily on the Schimmel argument in its decisions in both
Tucker, 878 F.2d at 568, and Antkowiak =r rel. Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 639-40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub noam. Doe v. Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988). In the Conklin opinion, the court
held that "a state cannot be held accountable for the costs that a parent has independently
incurred in sending his child to an unaccredited or unapproved special education facility."
Conklin, 946 F.2d at 311 n.5. The reimbursement issue in Conklin was ultimately moot, and,
consequently, the court's language constituted mere dictum. Id. The court, however, had not
been shy in explaining exactly why public financing of unapproved schooling is improper. Id.
Thus, in Carter, the Fourth Circuit had to confront not only the Second Circuit's counter
holdings in Tucker and Antkowiak, but also its own decisions in Schimmel and Conklin. See
Parkinson, supra note 106, at 900 (discussing Fourth Circuit's stray from precedent in its Carter
decision).
154. Carter, 950 F.2d at 161.
155. Id. (stating proposition that court has discretion to have state reimburse parents who
unilaterally place their child in private school (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1994))). The
court noted that without reimbursement, many students cannot truly receive a free appropriate
public education. Id. (citing Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-
70 (1985)).
156. Id. at 162.
157. Id. The court made a distinction between placements made by public schools and those
made by parents. Id. The Fourth Circuit asserted that it agreed with its earlier statement in
Schimmeh "The statute simply does not permit school systems to place and fund handicapped
children in unapproved private schools." Id. (quoting Schimmel, 819 F.2d 477, 484 (4th Cir.
1987) (emphasis added in Carter). The court continued, "this language states only the unre-
markable proposition that the public schoolsmay not place a child in a private school that has not
been approved by the state." Id. The issue of whether parents may make such a placement had
not previously been decided. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (4) (B) (ii) (1994) (requiring, in private
placements, that SEA "shall determine whether such schools and facilities meet standards that
THE AMERICAN UNmmRSITY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 45:1479
made clear that the appropriateness standard utilized in Rowley should
govern when a unilateral placement in a private educational facility
is proper under the Act-in other words, when the private setting is
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."1 8
The fundamental difference between the opinions in Carter and
Tucker is the manner in which the language of the Act is interpreted.
The court in Tucker employed a strict, literal interpretation, while the
Fourth Circuit attempted to decide in accordance with what best fit
the purpose of the Act:
[I] t hardly seems consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents
from educating their child at a [private] school of [their choice]
that provides an appropriate education simply because that school
lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that
failed to meet the child's needs in the first place.'59
The Fourth Circuit's direct contradiction of the Second Circuit's
reasoning in Tucker prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
on the issue of whether state approval is a prerequisite for parental
reimbursement 60 In a rare unanimous decision, the Court af-
firmed the Fourth Circuit's stand in Carter.
161
3. Supreme Court decision
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unified court, elucidated the Court's
broadening of the standard it had set forth only eight years earlier in
Burlington.6 Four main points emerge in demarcating the pre-
established finding that private education could be publicly recom-
pensed when a school district failed to comply with the IDEA's FAPE
doctrine. First, the Court did away with the need to have all private
apply to State and local educational agencies").
158. Carter, 950 F.2d at 163 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
The court further explained:
We do not believe that the Supreme Court... intended to impose on private schools
chosen by parents the whole panoply of duties that the Act imposes on the state.
Rather when a public school system has defaulted on its obligations under the Act, a
private school placement is "proper under the Act" if the education provided by the
private school is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."
XL (quoting Row/ey, 458 U.S. at 207).
159. Id. at 164.
160. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993).
161. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993) (holding that state
was required to pay for Respondent's education at private school as long as cost was reasonable).
162. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,369 (1985) (holding that
court has broad statutory discretion to order school authorities to "reimburse parents for their
expenditures... if the court ultimately determines that such [private] placement, rather than
a proposed IEP, is proper").
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IEPs designed and reviewed by the SEA." a Second, the Court
overruled its previous reading of the IDEA, which mandated that all
private placements necessarily meet state education standards. 64
Third, the Court addressed the inevitable financial burden that its
decision would have on school districts nationwide."6  Finally,
Justice O'Connor curtly stated that courts are granted almost
unfettered discretion in determining relief for IDEA violations.l 66
The Court found that parents are not necessarily barred from public
reimbursement simply because the school in which they choose to
enroll their child does not employ the IEP standard of evaluation, 67
or because the school's practices are not "'establish[ed],' 'revise[d],'
and 'review[ed]'" by the local educational agency."t  The Court
asserted that "[these requirements do not make sense in the context
of a parental placement,"69 because requiring public approval of a
private school's IEP, when "the parents' rejection of the school
district's proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents' decision to
put their child in a private school[,] ... would effectively eliminate
the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington."'17
Accordingly, the Court held that the parents' choice of a special
needs school need not meet state educational standards in order for
the school district to monetarily compensate them for the cost of the
private schooling.1 7' This finding was especially relevant in the
Carter case because South Carolina does not have an approval process
for private schools that teach disabled students. 72 The Court noted
that due to the state's case-by-case approval process, 73 "parents in
163. Carte, 114 S. Ct. at 366 (requiring state funding for Respondent's education at Trident
Academy, where SEA neither designed IEP nor approved Academy).
164. i (holding that "reimbursement is [not] necessarily barred by private school's failure
to meet state education standards").
165. hi. at 366 (recognizing that Court's decision has imposed "significant burden on States
and School districts that participate in IDEA").
166. i (noting broad discretion courts have in fashioning equitable relief).
167. Id.; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing IEP process).
168. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 365 (1993) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a)(5) (1994)).
169. Id.
170. Mi (noting parents would seldom be able to take advantage of their reimbursement
rights granted under Burlington).
171. I The Court made its decision very clean "[W]e disagree with the Second Circuit's
theory that 'a parent may not obtain reimbursement for a unilateral placement if that placement
was in a school that was not on [the State's] approved list of private' schools." Id. at 366
(quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1989)). Thus,
placement in a private school lacking state approval, the Court concluded, "is not itself a bar to
reimbursement." I& (emphasis added).
172. 1i
173. Id. (finding that "South Carolina keeps no publicly available list of approved private
schools, but instead approves private school placements on a case-by-case basis").
THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REvIEw [Vol. 45:1479
the position of Shannon's have no way of knowing at the time they
select a private school whether the school meets state standards.'17 4
The cooperation of school educational officials is required in such
circumstances, and when school officials do not recognize a true need
for private edification, the Court noted, "such cooperation is
unlikely."'"5
The Court also addressed the issue that mandating full reimburse-
ment for unilateral, parental placement may place "an unreasonable
burden on financially strapped local educational authorities."171
The Court might have foreseen this as being one of the most
persuasive arguments against its holding in Carter. However, the
Court rebutted the implied counter argument with two succinct
sentences:
[P]ublic educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing
parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of
two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a
public setting; or place the child in an appropriate private setting
of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and school officials
who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.171
The Court continued to explain that parental reimbursement is by no
means automatic after private placement.178 Not only must it be
shown that the public IEP was inappropriately tailored to meet the
educational needs of the disabled student, but also the parental
placement must be found to be proper under the IDEA.19 Even if
the public school fails in its responsibility to provide a FAPE, if the
resulting unilateral placement is ultimately determined to be
unsuitable, no compensation will be awarded.'
174. Id. This issue is clear in the court transcript, where counsel for the Carters asserted,
"The record at the administrative due process hearing... will show the parents said, 'Can our
daughter go to Hartsville, down the road, District One, Darlington, or Trident?'." Carter
Transcript, supra note 129, at 32 (statement of Peter W.D. Wright). The school district
maintained that its IEP was adequate, and thus there could be no approved school to which
Shannon could be sent in substitution. Id. at 34; see also supra note 140 (detailing Justice
O'Connor's summary of Petitioner's argument in due process hearing).
175. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366.
176. Id.
177. Id. (explaining also that parents, like Shannon's, who unilaterally change their child's
placement during pendency of review proceedings without official consent "do so at their own
financial risk"). "
178. Id. In fact, in the same 1993-94 Term in which Carterwas decided, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to a similar case from the Sixth Circuit. In Doe v. Tullahoma City Sch. Bd. of
Educ., parents of a neurologically impaired child were denied reimbursement for the costs of
a private education, because the circuit court found that the IEP offered by the school system
was appropriate under the IDEA. 9 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2104
(1994).
179. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366.
180. Id.
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The final point in the Court's decision leaves the most room for
discrepancy. The Court referenced both the IDEA and its decision
in Burlington to conclude that once a court determines that public
placement violates the IDEA, it has "'broad discretion' in ...
fashioning... equitable relief under IDEA."'81
III. COMMENT
The Court's holding in Carter was justifiably accurate and was a
grand victory for students with special educational needs.18 2 Twenty
years have passed since the enactment of the IDEA, and the Act's
congressional sponsors doubtlessly would be proud that their
ambitious and worthwhile goals were unequivocally upheld in the
recent Carter decision. The Court premised its decision to allow
parents to be reimbursed for unapproved private schooling almost
entirely on its deference to the legislators' intent in the Act.' The
Court examined the Act's language and ruled accordingly: "IDEA was
intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education
that is both appropriate and free .... To read the provisions of
§ 1401 (a) (18) to bar reimbursement in the circumstances of this case
would defeat this purpose."'84 Had the Court held otherwise, the
precepts of the IDEA, and the rights of individuals protected under
those precepts, effectively would have been eradicated.
Shannon Carter's story is not that different from those of her
learning disabled predecessors and their concerned parents. 85
What distinguishes her case is that the Supreme Court in Carter
attempted to clarify issues regarding appropriate education and
available remedies that the Rowley and Burlington decisions left
unsettled. 86  Many aspects of the IDEA and its related legislation
181. Id. (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department ofEduc., 471 U.S. 359,369 (1985)).
182. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules forParents in Training of Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1993, at A16 (highlighting future impact that Carter decision would have on rights of learning
disabled students).
183. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 364 (noting that "neither the text of the Act nor its legislative
history imposes a 'requirement that the private school be approved by the state in parent-
placement reimbursement cases'" (quoting Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 950 F.2d
156, 162 (1991))).
184. Id at 365.
185. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)
(requesting that school district reimburse parents for interim private placement during judicial
appeals proceedings); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (contesting school
district's refusal to provide sign language interpreter for deaf student); Tucker v. Bay Shore
Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1989) (challenging public school authorities
to reimburse for private placement of learning disabled student).
186. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366. The opinion in Rowley set the standard. Associate Justice
Rehnquist held that the FAPE requirement was satisfied when the public school provided
sufficient instruction to permit the disabled child to "benefit" educationally from the schooling.
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and case history are theoretically ideal, yet lack the specifics that are
required for the ideology to become practice. To be most effective,
the precepts of the IDEA, and the improvements set forth in the
Carter decision, must be applied in a disciplined and specified
manner.
The twentieth anniversary of the IDEA's enactment in 1995 signaled
the need for its re-authorization. Recently, both houses of Con-
gress,"' as well as the Department of Education,l" s have drafted
Rowy, 458 U.S. at 189. Aside from asserting that the Act was not intended to "maximize the
potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children,'" the Court failed to explain further what it meant by "benefit." I. at 189-90. The
Court in Burlington attempted to elucidate the statute's intent in authorizing courts to "grant
such relief as [they] determine[] is appropriate." Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2) (1994)). It determined that, aside from conferring "broad discretion on the
court... [t]he type of relief is not further specified." Id. The Court speculated: "Absent
other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be 'appropriate' in light
of the purpose of the Act." Id Thus, there clearly was no established means to define the Act's
intended appropriate level of education for teaching handicapped children absent broadjudicial
discretion.
187. Currently, the House of Representatives Committee on Economic and Educational
Opportunities is drafting a revision of the IDEA that will incorporate provisions regarding
assistance to states with funding and additional procedural safeguards. The Staff Hearing Draft
of the IDEA Improvement Act of 1996 sets forth twenty major issues addressed by the House's
suggested amendments to the IDEA. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, 105TH CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF THE STAFF HEARING DRAFT
OF THE IDEA IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996, 1-4 (Feb. 27, 1996) [hereinafter HOUSE DRAFIT].
Relevant provisions address maintaining the "stay put provision" and restructuring requirements
regarding notifying parents of their procedural and other rights under the IDEA. Id. at 1-2.
Most interestingly, the House version addresses the payment for placement of students in private
schools without the consent of or referral to the public agency. This provision, if passed, would
prevent tax-payer financed private school education when the public schools have never been
given the opportunity to determine if the child can be served in public schools. Id. at 5. The
provision would require parents to give written notice ten days in advance in order to receive
reimbursement for placing their child in a private school without local education agency
consent. Id The House draft would require that local schools must be permitted to conduct
an initial evaluation of a student prior to publicly funded private school placement. Id.
Exceptions to the notice requirement are included: (1) for parents who can not read or write
English; (2) when providing notice would result in delay that would most likely result in physical
or serious mental harm to the child; (3) when the school prevents the parent from providing
notice; and (4) for parents who did not receive notice of this requirement. Id. The House
Committe's draft has not yet been moved on in the House. Telephone Interview with Kevin
MacMillan, Leglislative Assistant, House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities
(Apr. 11, 1996).
The Senate Subcommittee on Disabilities has drafted a similar revision that includes language
regarding the civil rights and discretionary issues inherent in much of the IDEA language.
Telephone Interview with Pat Morrisy, Legislative Director, Senate Subcommittee on Disabilities
(Oct. 5, 1995). The Senate bill (51578) was introduced on February 27, 1996. It passed
through the Senate Labor Committee with a 16-1 vote. S1578 was marked-up and reported out
on March 21, 1996. Telephone Interview with Legislative Staff, Senate Subcommittee on
Disabilities (Apr. 11, 1996).
One of the major differences between the House draft and the Senate bill is their respective
treatment of federal block grants to states. HOUSE DRAFt at 1; Telephone Interview with
Legislative Staff, Senate Subcommittee on Disabilities (Apr. 11, 1996). While the House bill
seeks to implement a straight census model, in which states are funded according to how many
special needs children they must educate, the Senate espouses a more flexible standard, in
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amendments to the IDEA in order to continue to advance the-
purpose of the Act.8 9 In a letter to Congress, the Department of
Education optimistically stated, "With this reauthorization, we have
the opportunity to take what we have learned over the past twenty
years and use it to update and improve this important law." 9'
Using the knowledge from two decades of applying the IDEA's
idealistic doctrines to real-life scenarios in which learning disabled
students have suffered a breach of SEA duty, the modernized version
of the Act should include guidelines with which courts can more
consistently apply needed remedies.
191
Two portions of the decision in Carter require more explanation
and guidance if they are to be consistently applied to all learning
disabled students. First, the Court in Carter rendered void the cases
that required state approval of parental placements, 192 and replaced
this "badge of state approval" with the Row/ey standard under which
the school must be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." 9' This criterion is vague and is not
which the state is given a certain amount of funding, and its direct allocation to the local
educational authorities is determined at the state, rather than federal, level. I&
188. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra note 42, at 1. The Clinton administration's
proposal is based on six principles that support its "mission to improve educational results for
children with disabilities." Id. at 1. The six issues set forth by the Department of Education are:
(1) to align the IDEA with state and local education reform efforts so students with disabilities
can benefit from them; (2) to improve results for students with disabilities through higher
expectations and meaningful access to the general curriculum, to the maximum extent possible;
(3) to address individual needs in the least restrictive environment for the student; (4) to
provide families and teachers-those closest to students-with the knowledge and training to
effectively support students' learning; (5) to focus on teaching and learning; and (6) to
strengthen early intervention to ensure that every child starts school "ready to learn." lM. at 1-3.
Language from the Administration's proposal has been used in the drafting of the Senate bill;
however, the Administration's draft most likely will not be voted on in the Republican Congress.
Telephone Interviewwith Legislative Staff, Senate Subcommittee on Disabilities (April 11, 1996).
189. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra note 42, at 3.
190. Letter from Richard W. Riley, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, to Newt
Gingrich, Speaker, House of Representatives (June 30, 1995) (on file with TheAmerican Univerity
Law Review). The letter continued, "As we undertake a review of this legislation, we reaffirm our
commitment to the basic purposes of the IDEA and the recognition of the Federal role in
ensuring that all children with disabilities are provided with the equal educational opportunity
that the Constitution guarantees." Id.
191. CLINTONADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supranote 42, at 3. The Department ofEducation
cites several reasons to amend the IDEA. too many students are failing courses and "dropping
out of school;" without appropriate intervention, many learning disabled students get in trouble
with the law and spend time in jail; and limited English proficiency is often incorrectly identified
as a learning disability, and consequently children are placed in special education programs and
given lower goal expectations. I&.
192. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 865 (1993). Justice O'Connor
explained, "In this case, as in all Burlington reimbursement cases, ... where the private
placement has necessarily been made over the school district's objection, the private school
education will not be under 'public supervision and direction.'" Id.
193. Id. at 864 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
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easily applied uniformly." Second, the Court, in accordance with
the IDEA's exact language,19 granted to any court hearing IDEA
challenges full discretionary power to determine not only the
existence of an IDEA violation, but also the "appropriate and
reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required."'96
Granting such expansive judicial license often results in inconsistent
application of the "rules" set forth in Carter.9 To aid those whom
the IDEA was enacted to protect-the learning disabled-related
regulations and case law must include more concrete guidelines for
following the Court's directions.9 8
A. A Better Standard of 'Appropriate" is Needed
The requirement of state approval for unilateral parental place-
ments "doles] not make sense."" As the Court correctly noted in
Carter, it would be a type of "catch 22" injustice to require parents to
seek state approval from a public system that has failed their
expectations in the pasty2° By analogy the Supreme Court is
accustomed to resolving such conflicts when it is faced with two
incompatible constitutional amendments, one of which it must find
controlling. 2°' Similarly, here the Court had to weigh the provision
194. See infra note 197 and accompanying text (listing cases that have inconsistently applied
Rowley standard).
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994). "[T]he court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing
its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate" Id. (emphasis added).
196. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366.
197. CompareUnion Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994) (entitling parents
of autistic child to reimbursement for "appropriate" private schooling)and Reusch v. Fountain,
872 F. Supp. 1421, 1439 (D. Md. 1994) (awarding to parents fees relating to public school
system's failure to provide adequate IEP to disabled students) and Gerstmyer v. Howard County
Pub. Sch., 850 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Md. 1994) (reimbursing parents for private school
placement upon showing that public school evaded duty to formulate IEP for disabled student)
with Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228, 234 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding school
district not obligated under Act to reimburse parents for cost of child's speech therapy services
received at out-of-state private school where parents unilaterally placed child) and Ivan P. v.
Westport Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp. 74, 82 (D. Conn. 1994) (affirming district court's equitable
use of discretion in allowing partial reimbursement to parents upon finding public IEP
inappropriate).
198. A Connecticut district court has stated, "[T1he only 'limit' on judges fashioning
equitable relief pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) is the consideration of what is 'appropriate'
in light of the purposes of the IDEA." Ivan P., 865 F. Supp. at 82 (citing Burlington Sch.
Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)).
199. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 365.
200. Id. (noting that parents' choices are either to place child in state approved, but
inappropriate, school or incur costs for appropriate school).
201. See, eg, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (upholding penalty
enhancer despite its similarity to hate speech laws); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2547-49 (1992) (holding hate speech initiative violative of First Amendment); see also Harvard
Law Review Association, Freedom of Speech, Press, and Association: Penalty Enhancement for Bias-
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of the IDEA that sets forth the very purpose of the Act2 2 -to
provide a FAPE-against the provision that defines what that purpose
is,203 and determine which was more vital to the education of
learning disabled students. The Court correctly found that the
purpose of the IDEA is the more important, and that to require SEA
approval as a prerequisite to retroactive compensation would
unjustifiably preclude disabled children from receiving FAPEs.2°
Perhaps the most influential fact pattern which supported the
Supreme Court's holding in Carter was the Second Circuit's opinion
in Antkowiak ex rel. Antkowiak v. Ambach.2°5 In this poignant case,
the court's strict statutory interpretation resulted in a denial of a
FAPE for an emotionally disturbed and learning disabled student."'
The school district conceded that it was not able to provide an
appropriate education for the learning disabled student yet was willing
to place her in any of several state approved private schools. 7
Upon learning that none of the approved facilities would accept their
child, the parents placed her in the only institution that would enroll
her-an unapproved, out-of-state, private school.2 °" Although a
hearing officer and the district court determined that the unilateral
placement provided an education that was appropriate under the
Act, 209 the Second Circuit denied tuition reimbursement based
solely on the fact that the facility was not state approved.210
Cases such as Antkowiak support the Court's decision in Carter to
discard this unreasonably inflexible standard and adopt a more
agreeable one. The Rowley standard,2 11 adopted in its stead, howev-
er, is too nebulous to be applied effectively and is clearly too
Motivated Crimes; 107 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1993) (discussing tension between, and ambiguity of,
MitcheU and R.A.V. decisions).
202. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994) (stating purpose of IDEA as "to assure thatall children with
disabilities have available to them... a free appropriate education ... designed to meet their
unique needs").
203. Id. § 1401(a) (18)(B). "The term 'free appropriate public education' means special
education and related services that.. .meet the standards of the State educational agency." Id.
204. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 365 (1993).
205. 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
206. Antkowiak ev reL Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635,642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub non.
Doe v. Sobel, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
207. Id. at 638.
208. I&
209. Id. (noting that related services provided to student were "'necessary to enable her to
derive benefit from'" educational instruction (quoting Antkowiak ex reL Antkowiak v. Ambach,
635 F. Supp. 1405, 1416 (W.D.N.Y. 1987))).
210. Id. at 642 (noting also that court seemed to consider parties' focus on litigation rather
than on cooperation in finding approved placement as relevant to decision).
211. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (stating that standard for satisfying
FAPE requirement is met when public school provides instruction sufficient to allow disabled
student to "benefit" academically from education).
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subjective. The Court in Rowey attempted to establish a two-part test
for determining whether the requirements of the IDEA have been
met: "First, has the state complied with the procedures set forth in
the Act? And second, is the [I]ndividualized [E]ducation [P]rogram
developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?""' This second
prong of the test, which was intended to make IDEA decisions easier,
is the more problematic.
This model is an improvement from prior case law espousing that
state educational agency approval of private schools was the foremost
method for certifying whether a unilateral placement is worthy of
state reimbursement. 213 But determining whether an educational
setting is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits" 2 4 is often difficult and burdens the courts with
the need for an in-depth understanding of realistic teaching goals and
standards of learning progress over time.215  There should be a
brighter line.
The task of developing instructional goals for students who have
trouble learning in traditional settings must be undertaken on a case-
by-case basis. Courts and judges, however, are not the best parties to
make such determinations.216 The IEP is currently the best vehicle
through which educational programs can be customized to children's
special needs, and these individualized goals should continue to be
developed separately for each student. In order to familiarize courts,
judges, and parents with what constitutes reasonable progress,
however, SEAs should create guidelines developed from national
averages of IEPs that have previously been found to be suitable under
212. 1& at 206-07.
213. See Tucker v. Bayshore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1989)
(requiring SEA approval for all private placements of special needs students).
214. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 950 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Rowy, 458 U.S. at 207), afd, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
215. Researchers and clinicians in the learning disabilities field contend that "learning
disabilities remain one of the least understood yet most debated disabling conditions that affect
children in the United States." G. REID LYON Er AL., BETTER UNDERSTANDING LEARNING
DISABILITIES, NEw VIEWS FROM RESEARCH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 1 (1993). Educators and scientists have a difficult time classifying and setting
appropriate goals for special needs children. "[O]ur current thinking about this heterogeneous
array of disorders has been based on fragmentary evidence, typically derived from technically
inadequate measurement instruments, and interpreted within the context of theoretical and
conceptual frameworks that have not been clinically or scientifically validated." Id. at xvii. It
is improper to force the judiciary to fully understand the intricacies of what should be deemed
"appropriate" under the IDEA when scientists are still struggling with that question.
216. See Huskey, supra note 95, at 193 ("By what standard is a judge to determine
appropriateness of an education: from the dry statistics and reports offered by the school
district and its experts or the demonstration of significant improvement of a child plaintiff
standing before the court?").
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the IDEA.2" Such models could set parameters within which a
child with a certain disability should be performing. As with any
compilation of averages, a certain factor of variation should be
accounted for, as well as the extent and combination of the student's
disabilities.18
The Court in Rowley warned lower courts to avoid substituting "their
own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review."219 Pre-established guidelines would
aid courts in making the often troublesome decisions about whether
an IEP was "reasonably calculated to benefit" a child.220 These
guidelines would also be useful to parents who may want the very best
educational opportunity for their disabled child, yet do not know what
achievements they reasonably should expect from their special needs
student. Furthermore, these charts may decrease the number of suits
brought under the IDEA's FAPE requirement. If parents see that the
IEP developed by their public school conforms with other IEPs
developed nationwide for children with similar handicaps, they might
be less likely to challenge the system.2
Because it will almost always be the case that a child will progress
more in a special need-intensive private setting,222 such pre-estab-
lished parameters of reasonable public education goals might check
the exercise ofjudicial discretion. The decision whether to reimburse
for unilateral parental placement should not be founded on the
differential between the student's performance in his or her previous
public setting and that in his or her current private academic
setting.21 Specifically, the evaluation of the private schooling
should not be considered until it is first established that the public
217. Just as pediatricians often give parents of youngsters a chart of what is considered a
"normal" physical growth pattern, SEAs should develop similar models to enable those not well-
acquainted with academia to know what is reasonable.
218. For example, such standards could state that the average progress proposed by IEPs of
deaf children (that have not been challenged under the IDEA) is nine months academic
advancement for a ten-month school year.
219. Board ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
220. Id. at 206-07.
221. PeterWright, the Carters' attorney, doubts that such standards would decrease parental
challenges. Interview with Peter W.D. Wright, Attorney for Respondent, Florence County School
District Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993), Richmond, VA (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Wright
Interview].
222. See Huskey, supra note 95, at 193 (explaining that students are more likely to progress
in "private setting that offers more individual attention and room for advancement").
223. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct 361, 366 (1993) (noting that
reimbursement is available only after court rules that "public placement violated IDEA, and that
the private school placement was proper under the Act").
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IEP was inappropriate under the IDEA.224 Public schools are not
required to provide all the advantages that private schools offer, but
so long as they are providing an adequate FAPE to a disabled student,
the child's private academic progress should be irrelevant.21
B. Discretionary Relief
The judicial discretion granted by the IDEA relates to the second
flaw in the Court's opinion in Carter-its grant of broad discretion in
fashioning a remedy once a court determines the existence of an
IDEA violation.22' There is simply too much leeway in this standard.
Unless the Court or Congress contributes more details by which lower
courts can determine whether parents and school districts are acting
reasonably under the Act, arbitrary decisions will continue to deny
disabled children FAPEs on illogical grounds.
1. The "bad faith" factor
"The relief is a matter of the equities." 221 "Bad faith" on the part
of either party has traditionally been taken into account when courts
weigh the "equitable considerations [that] are relevant in fashioning
relief."221 In an article by ProfessorJerry R. Parkinson espousing the
Tucker view-that "a parent may not obtain reimbursement for a
unilateral placement if that placement was in a school that was not on
[the State's] approved list of private ... schools" 21--it becomes
clear that other factors may play into a judge's decision whether to
grant relief.
The courts should draw the line at state-approved private schools,
particularly if parents and school officials are to be encouraged to
work together in a cooperative effort .... If either parents or
school officials act in bad faith or refuse to cooperate in the joint
224. Id. at 365 (noting that parents should not be automatically forbidden from enrolling
child in unapproved private school when public school system "fhiled to meet the child's needs
in the first place").
225. Id. (acknowledging that § 1401(a) (18) requirements of Act do not apply to "private
parental placements" and thus need not meet state educational agency standards).
226. Id.; see also Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)
(conjecturing about Act's intention for granting broad discretionary relief).
227. Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedy of Compensatoy Education Under the IDEA, 95 EDUC. L. REP.
483, 485 (1995) (citing Murphy v. Timberlane Regional Sch. Dist., 973 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.
1992)).
228. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374. Under Burlington's equitable relief approach, "if the
defendant district engaged in bad faith, its only hope for mitigation or even excusal would be
if the plaintiff parents also engaged in bad faith." Id.; see also Zirkel, supra note 227, at 485 n.17
(discussing equitable approach, approved in Burlington, when bad faith may have been fhtal to
relief sought).
229. Tucker v. Bayshore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1989).
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effort to provide an appropriate education for disabled children,
the courts' relief should be shaped accordingly."o
Parkinson's colleague, Timothy M. Huskey, agrees: "A parent that
acts in bad faith in altering a child's educational environment should
be denied relief in the form of interim reimbursement."
23 1
Setting such a precedent could have negative repercussions, such
as courts denying reimbursement as an incentive for parents in
subsequent situations to make more concerted efforts to cooperate
with school officials. If judges were regularly to determine that
unilateral withdrawals by parents of learning disabled children from
inadequate public settings were a result of "bad faith,""' or a
disregard of the "cooperative effort"23 advocated by the IDEA,
parental reimbursement rarely would be granted. Courts must realize
that when parents ultimately 'jump the gun" and prematurely place
their child in a private setting, it is rarely a result of their disrespect
for the system or of their malicious intent to privately educate their
child without having to foot the bill.2" Parents frequently are
anxious and concerned about their special-needs child2" and, most
importantly, parents are fearful that if they patiently delay their
withdrawal, their child will fall further and further academically
behind his or her peers.
2. The money factor
The decision whether to grant parental reimbursement-and if
granted, the amount-is currently based entirely on judicial discre-
tion.2" Although allowing unilateral private placements to be
refunded upon a finding of inadequate public service, the Court in
Carter recognized the potential burden its holding would have on
"financially strapped" school districts.3 7 There was a persuasive
230. Parkinson, supra note 106, at 910.
231. Huskey, supra note 95, at 189.
232. Huskey, supra note 95, at 189.
233. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (18) (1994).
234. Peter Wright asserts that parents are chiefly concerned with their child's reading,
writing, and arithmetic skills. He stated, "They simply want their child to be a functioning
member of society." Wright Interview, supra note 221. Reimbursement and vengence are not
parents' top priorities. 1&
235. "When the doctor explains to the parent for the first time that their child learns
differently from other children (i.e., has some type of a disability) and may need to be taught
differently, the parent may often experience denial, anger, and depression." PEDIACTRC BLOCS
OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 147, at 1.
236. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993) (noting that
"[c] ourts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors,
including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required").
237. 1&
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argument before the Court to rule more pragmatically,38 and to
protect the limited resources of the nation's public school sys-
tems. 39 Still, the Court correctly found in favor of the Act's pur-
pose and left the remedies up to the individual courts hearing
subsequent related cases."4 The Court, however, should have set
forth clearer standards by which such limited resources could best be
applied to serve all learning disabled children.
"In an area where the child's concerns should predominate, it all
boils down to money.""24  Financial issues always play a significant
role in the drafting of legislation, and the creation of the IDEA was
no exception. Congress hoped that
[w]ith proper education services, many [learning disabled students]
would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society
instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such
services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their
dependence on society. 42
Thus, Congress intended to limit its future monetary obligations by
mandating that greater educational attention be paid to learning
disabled children. But, Congress also realized that "[t]he cost of
educating the disabled child can be astronomical."243 At the time
the Carter case came to trial, the average per student expenditure in
Florence County School District Four was $4,102.56 per academic
238. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 138, at 26-29. The school district argued that a finding
for the Carters would result in an adverse impact on the finite monetary resources of public
school systems nationwide. Id Similar arguments were made in amicus curiae briefs from the
Council of State Governments, the International City/County Management Association, the
National Association of Counties, the National Association of State Boards of Education, the
National Governors' Association, the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, the National
League of Cities, the National School Boards Association, as well as in ajoint brief submitted
by seventeen states. Huskey, supra note 95, at 190 n.150.
239. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361,366 (1993) (dismissing school
district's argument that reimbursements would financially strap local educational agencies). The
court in Carter determined that such overwhelming financial burdens were only placed upon
school districts that were not otherwise meeting IDEA requirements. Id. However, related costs
to IDEA placement will remain discretionary under Carter. IL; see also Dell v, Board of Educ.
Township High Sch. Dist. 113, 32 F.3d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 1994) (reviewing, on other grounds,
finding by hearing officer below that IDEA-related costs submitted by independent evaluator
were excessive and required school district to reimburse parents for only "usual and customary
costs of educational assessment").
240. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366.
241. Parkinson, supra note 123, at 191.
242. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
243. Huskey, supra note 95, at 191. In a report to Congress, the Department of Education
declared that, in 1989, the average expenditure for each student in a public special education
resource program was $2,398 per school year. If that child were placed in a self-contained
special education environment, the cost increased to $5,700 per year. Additionally, the report
stated that the average cost per student in a private, residential program equaled $31,616 per
academic year. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED AcT 119, 127 (1989).
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year,' yet the school district was required to reimburse Shannon's
parents for her education at Trident Academy at almost three times
that figure.245 There clearly existed-and still exists-a need to set
a standard by which courts can determine where to draw the line
when it comes to reimbursement.2
46
The Court in Carter, using its "broad Oudicial] discretion,"247
"consider[ed] all relevant factors," and aptly granted the Carters full
reimbursement for Shannon's private education. 4 The holding
was legitimate in that case, but in order to prevent local school
districts from exhausting their limited pecuniary resources, Congress,
as well as the courts, must promulgate criteria to facilitate courts in
developing appropriate remedies for violations of the IDEA.
The Court in Carter established that "[t] otal reimbursement will not
be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private
education was unreasonable."249  This standard, however, still leaves
courts with no prototype of an ideal reimbursement situation.
Keeping in mind that the decision in Carter did away with the need
for states to maintain lists of pre-approved private schools, 250 a
workable standard can be achieved.
This Note proposes a formula that would require each public
school district to establish a "radius" within which all private schools
within that area would be accounted for and ranked according to cost
and proven ability to educate special needs children. Upon a finding
that a public school district failed in its duty to provide a FAPE to a
learning disabled child, the student's parents would be permitted to
place their child in any available private institution within that
geographic domain that could be considered able under the
IDEA2 1 to provide the pupil with an appropriate education."
244. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 138, at 26.
245. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 138, at 27. The cost of Shannon's education at Trident
Academy totaled almost $12,000 annually. The school district argued that "[eivery dollar paid
to reimburse the Carters for Shannon's private education is one less dollar available to the
students of [the already financially distressed district]." Id.
246. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in IDEA-based
awards of parental reimbursement).
247. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
248. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993).
249. Id.
250. Id.; see U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUCATION REPORT 89 (June 1995) (asserting that
states are no longer required by Department of Education to compile list of pre-approved
private institutions).
251. The Rowley "reasonably calculated" standard should be used in order to determine
which schools offer a proper education under the IDEA. See supra note 110 and accompanying
text (discussing Carter decision's use of Rowley standard).
252. It is this consideration for which the court must weigh "all relevant factors," including
whether the education plan at the private school is "reasonably calculated" to provide
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Parents would be entitled to full reimbursement for all costs associat-
ed with such a private placement, contingent upon the child's
enrollment in the least expensive, suitable educational institution within
the pre-set radius."3 If parents unilaterally choose to send their
child to a private school within the area that is not the least costly, the
court equitably should decide to reimburse the parents up to the
reparations which they would have paid had the parents chosen the
least expensive, suitable school.'
Concededly, there will be many school districts that offer no
adequate, private placement for learning disabled children within
such boundaries. In such circumstances, parents may be entitled to
full indemnification for educational costs at the nearest suitable
institution outside the radius. 5 The costs associated with these
placements, however, may prove to be burdensome for the parents,
who are "gambling with the chance that they, ultimately, may not be
granted reimbursement."26  Consequently, parents of disabled
children may choose to travel farther outside the district's zone in
search of more inexpensive options. 7  This model is not ideal, 258
educational benefits to the child, in determining whether the private setting is adequate. Carter,
114 S. Ct. at 366. Without a pre-approved list of schools, these determinations may need to be
made retroactively, as they were in Carter, with the use of the RowLy standard. ItL
253. This provision would be concordant with Florence County School District Four's
assertion that "[p]arents in the Burlington situation must not be left free of virtually all
constraints to select any private education of their choice, so long as it meets the minimal
requirement of allowing the child to receive educational benefits." Petitioner's Brief, supra note
138, at 27. It is also consistent with the IDEA's requirement that all students are entitled to an
"appropriate" education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (18) (1994).
254. For example, a school district may be surrounded by 10 private institutions within a pre-
established 50 mile radius. Six of those schools may offer an adequate academic atmosphere
for educating deaf children. If the parents of a deaf student unilaterally choose to place their
child in one of these six schools, they will be entitled to reimbursement only for the costs
associated with the least expensive of the six, regardless of which school they choose.
255. It is in these situations where one might find a "Cadillac situation" being fully funded
with public dollars. See Huskey, supra note 95, at 189 (implying that "Cadillac situation" exists
when cost of private education is unreasonable); see also Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.Sd 455, 459-
60 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2104 (1994) (holding that schools are not required to
provide "Cadillac" of educational programs to disabled students, provided students receive
.meaningful educational benefit"). Granting greater relief would be justified in instances in
which the parents were already inconvenienced by the public school's breach of duty that
created their need to travel great and often unreasonable distances to secure appropriate
placement.
256. Wright Interview, supra note 221.
257. Ifreimbursement were subsequently found to be appropriate, the parents plainly would
be granted only what they already had spent for their student's enrollment and related services.
258. The Carters' attorney, Peter Wright, asserts that a standard such as this may result in
increased litigation regarding which private schools within a set region should be considered
appropriate under the Act. Wright Interview, supra note 221. Each private institution involved
may seek to assert that each school is, in fact, an adequate placement for children with certain
disabilities. Wright Interview, supra note 221. This model, however, does not propose that each
district have a "pre-approved list," and thus litigation may be avoided with the retroactive use of
the Rowey standard.
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but instead recognizes the reality of finite public educational
resources." With set guidelines for reimbursement, such as those
set forth above, courts may be better able to stretch the dollars of
public school systems to reach as many learning disabled children as
possible.
CONCLUSION
With the 1975 enactment of the IDEA, "Congress embarked on a
mission to equalize the education offered disabled students to that
offered all students.""' Twenty-one years later, it is apparent that
this "carefully drafted and visionary piece of legislation"26 1 requires
further refinement if it is to generate these expected results. The
Carter case is a clear example of the need to define evaluative
guidelines in addition to broad requirements. Safeguarding the rights
of learning disabled students is of immense importance, and if the
decision in Carter is to have its intended impact on the special
education arena, an effort must be made to focus less on policy and
more on application.
259. Dr. G. Reid Lyon praises the "radius" theory as being "a solid, common sense approach
to a difficult problem .... Such a theory could advance the interests of public school systems,
L.D. children, and their parents." Interview with G. Reid Lyon, Ph.D., Psychologist, Human
Learning and Behavior Branch of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD (Jan. 17, 1996).
260. Huskey, supra note 95, at 187.
261. Goldman, supra note 45, at 245.

